Tomorrow’s report on the employment situation in November is widely expected to show a steepish increase in joblessness. The number of first-time claims filed for unemployment insurance benefits last month was about 2.2 million, or about 50 percent higher than in the same month last year and about 23 percent higher than in October, based on seasonally unadjusted numbers.
If overall unemployment rose by the same percentage from October to November, then the unemployment rate ought to have been about 7.4 percent last month, the highest level in about 15 years. Of course, the feds can tinker with labor force numbers and seasonal adjustments (November normally is a month that sees strong hiring in anticipation of the holiday retail season) and the actual reported unemployment rate may not be that bad; the Wall Street consensus is for a figure of just 6.7 percent, up from 6.5 percent in October.
Not contributing significantly to whatever increase does get reported will be the top executives of America’s largest publicly traded corporations, because layoffs never extend to the boardroom no matter how bad a job the managers have been doing. On the other side of the coin, the trillion-dollar-plus economic rescue plan to date hasn’t come anywhere near helping the average worker.
So who has it helped? Well, we might suppose that the shareholders of the nation’s biggest financial companies have benefited; those companies, which have been the biggest recipients of our money, might well have seen their shares fall even lower than they are now if Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke hadn’t generously shoveled our money into their vaults.
And just who are those shareholders? Regular folks like you and me, who’ve saved a penny here and there and patriotically invested in the companies that make America great, right? Um, no, not so much.
Bank of America, for example, the country’s biggest banking firm, is 55.5 percent owned by “institutions,” meaning other banking firms, big Wall Street brokerage houses and, yes, some pension funds and mutual fund companies. Citigroup is 63.3 percent institionally owned, and struggling insurer American International Group is 55.9 percent owned by institutions.
Just which institutions are they? In fact, it’s a pretty cozy little group: Of the top 25 holders of each of these three companies as of Sept. 30, 15 are the same ones in all three cases. Here’s the list:
AXA
Bank of New York Mellon
Barclays Global Investments
Barrow Hanley Mewhinney & Strauss
Brandes Investment
Capital Research Global
Capital World Investment
Deutsche Bank
FMR LLC
Geode Capital Management
Goldman Sachs Group
Northern Trust Corp.
T. Rowe Price
State Street Corp.
Vanguard Group Inc.
Note in particular that Goldman Sachs is the big brokerage house that used to be headed by Daddy Warbucks, I mean Henry Paulson.
This sort of thing helps explain why executives of these kinds of companies continue to receive unconscionable “compensation” packages no matter how the companies perform: because the biggest shareholders and the “independent” directors are all members of the same club or subculture. If anyone started holding one of them to reasonable standards, they’d all be in trouble.
Thursday, December 4, 2008
Tuesday, December 2, 2008
Bernanke Must Go
Some years ago (40, to be exact) I attended a rally for then-U.S. Sen. Eugene McCarthy, who was running against Lyndon Johnson for the Democratic nomination for president. “Clean Gene,” as he was called, shared a bit of barnyard humor that has stuck with me ever since. My knowledge of farm animals is pretty limited, so I can’t vouch for whether it’s true on a biological or zoological level.
According to McCarthy, pigs are mostly insensitive to temperature except in their snouts. In Minnesota, where McCarthy was from, it gets pretty cold, of course. But because pigs mainly sense temperature with their snouts, as long as their snouts are warm, they believe they’re warm all over. So when a pig gets cold, McCarthy said, it will try to warm itself up by sticking its snout between the hind legs of another pig.
According to McCarthy, it’s not unheard-of to see whole herds of swine forming a kind of daisy chain, each with its nose up the backside of the one in front of it. And if there’s an unexpected hard freeze, an unfortunate pig farmer might come out the next morning to find his entire herd frozen to death in a circle.
McCarthy shared this somewhat indelicate information as a metaphor for the behavior of politicians, but it also strikes me as highly applicable to the way financial regulators and executives have been behaving lately.
Take, for instance, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. Throughout the first half of this year, Bernanke insisted that the U.S. economy was not in a recession and stood a fair chance of avoiding one. While he acknowledged that the economy was weak and the financial system vulnerable because of mortgage-related problems, he expressed confidence that the Fed’s cuts in its key interest rate would be enough to prevent an actual economic decline.
We know now, of course, that Bernanke was wrong. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, a private nonprofit business group that is the quasi-official authority on economic cycles, the U.S. entered a recession a year ago this month.
What’s more, a lot of people have known that all along; even an armchair economist like me. Back on April 23, I wrote in my blog for The Post and Courier that “it would appear likely that we’ll look back at the fourth quarter of 2007 as the beginning of this recession.”
But Bernanke – who holds his job as Fed chairman because he’s regarded as one of the nation’s top economists – continued to insist that there was no recession and that a recession could, in fact, be avoided.
There are only two possible reasons why Bernanke kept saying those things: Either he’s an incompetent economist or he was being deliberately deceptive.
I’d probably opt for the latter explanation, because there does seem to be a kind of traditional belief in the financial community that denial of negative conditions will somehow make those conditions go away. (The real estate community took a somewhat similar approach early in the ongoing collapse of that market.) And there’s also the Straussian belief, widespread in the Bush administration, that deception of the citizenry is a valid policy tool.
However, it doesn’t matter which explanation you prefer. Either way, it’s clear that we have no good reason to trust Bernanke as a steward of our economy and financial system.
Bernanke’s partner in the ongoing economic Tweedledum and Tweedledee act, Henry Paulson, will be leaving office in January as part of the turnover of the White House to Barack Obama’s team. But Bernanke’s 4-year term as chairman of the Fed doesn’t expire until January 2010, and his 14-year (!) term on the Fed’s board will last until 2020.
The totally inadequate response of Bernanke and Paulson to the current economic and financial problems is reason enough to want them both gone. But now that we have clear, decisive evidence of Bernanke’s unreliability even on the level of Economics 101, it’s imperative that he be replaced as rapidly as possible.
Bernanke should do the honorable thing and resign, now. And if he won’t do that, then the new administration and the new Congress should do whatever is necessary to dismiss him for incompetence. All he has done is try to keep financial executives’ noses warm, but the economic temperature is still dropping.
According to McCarthy, pigs are mostly insensitive to temperature except in their snouts. In Minnesota, where McCarthy was from, it gets pretty cold, of course. But because pigs mainly sense temperature with their snouts, as long as their snouts are warm, they believe they’re warm all over. So when a pig gets cold, McCarthy said, it will try to warm itself up by sticking its snout between the hind legs of another pig.
According to McCarthy, it’s not unheard-of to see whole herds of swine forming a kind of daisy chain, each with its nose up the backside of the one in front of it. And if there’s an unexpected hard freeze, an unfortunate pig farmer might come out the next morning to find his entire herd frozen to death in a circle.
McCarthy shared this somewhat indelicate information as a metaphor for the behavior of politicians, but it also strikes me as highly applicable to the way financial regulators and executives have been behaving lately.
Take, for instance, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. Throughout the first half of this year, Bernanke insisted that the U.S. economy was not in a recession and stood a fair chance of avoiding one. While he acknowledged that the economy was weak and the financial system vulnerable because of mortgage-related problems, he expressed confidence that the Fed’s cuts in its key interest rate would be enough to prevent an actual economic decline.
We know now, of course, that Bernanke was wrong. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, a private nonprofit business group that is the quasi-official authority on economic cycles, the U.S. entered a recession a year ago this month.
What’s more, a lot of people have known that all along; even an armchair economist like me. Back on April 23, I wrote in my blog for The Post and Courier that “it would appear likely that we’ll look back at the fourth quarter of 2007 as the beginning of this recession.”
But Bernanke – who holds his job as Fed chairman because he’s regarded as one of the nation’s top economists – continued to insist that there was no recession and that a recession could, in fact, be avoided.
There are only two possible reasons why Bernanke kept saying those things: Either he’s an incompetent economist or he was being deliberately deceptive.
I’d probably opt for the latter explanation, because there does seem to be a kind of traditional belief in the financial community that denial of negative conditions will somehow make those conditions go away. (The real estate community took a somewhat similar approach early in the ongoing collapse of that market.) And there’s also the Straussian belief, widespread in the Bush administration, that deception of the citizenry is a valid policy tool.
However, it doesn’t matter which explanation you prefer. Either way, it’s clear that we have no good reason to trust Bernanke as a steward of our economy and financial system.
Bernanke’s partner in the ongoing economic Tweedledum and Tweedledee act, Henry Paulson, will be leaving office in January as part of the turnover of the White House to Barack Obama’s team. But Bernanke’s 4-year term as chairman of the Fed doesn’t expire until January 2010, and his 14-year (!) term on the Fed’s board will last until 2020.
The totally inadequate response of Bernanke and Paulson to the current economic and financial problems is reason enough to want them both gone. But now that we have clear, decisive evidence of Bernanke’s unreliability even on the level of Economics 101, it’s imperative that he be replaced as rapidly as possible.
Bernanke should do the honorable thing and resign, now. And if he won’t do that, then the new administration and the new Congress should do whatever is necessary to dismiss him for incompetence. All he has done is try to keep financial executives’ noses warm, but the economic temperature is still dropping.
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